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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Robinson-Patman Act' was enacted as an antitrust law during
the Great Depression of the 1930s in response to intensive lobby-
ing by independent wholesalers, brokers, and retailers who com-
plained of price discrimination by their suppliers, who favored the large
chains. Since its enactment in 1936, the Act has been the object of unre-
lenting criticism by legal scholars and economists. Critics charge that the
Act has been invoked to protect individual competitors and to deprive
consumers of low prices, a course they view as in direct conflict with the
basic goals of antitrust law: protecting competition, not competitors, and
advancing the consumer welfare. 2 Indeed, during the period from 1955
Member of the bar of Illinois and Wisconsin. Of counsel to Vedder, Price, Katif-
man & Kammholz, Chicago.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1988).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTiTRUsT PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 382-401 (1978); Wesley J. Liebeler, Let's Repeal It, 45 ANTITRUST U. 18 (1976);
Phil C. Neal, Let's Reform It, 45 ANTrrRuST L.J. 52 (1976); Edward F. Howrey et al., The
Robinson-Patman Act. How-Not Whether-It Should be Amended, 22 Rec. Ass'n B. City
N.Y. 621 (1967). But see, Harry Ballan, Note, The Courts' Assault on the Robinson-Patman
Act, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 634 (1992).
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through 1979, various presidential, executive department, and bar associ-
ation task forces recommended partial repeal or radical revision of the
Act.3 Despite the criticism and calls for repeal or revision, at the thresh-
old of the twenty-first century, the Robinson-Patman Act remains struc-
turally intact.
Most of the criticism has been aimed at the Federal Trade Commission
("FT'C") and court determinations under section 2(a) of the Act of the
likely effects on competition of price discrimination. Section 2(a) de-
clares it unlawful for a seller to discriminate in price between different
purchasers in interstate sales of commodities of like grade and quality
"where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition" with either the grantor or know-
ing recipient of the benefit of the discrimination, or with their customers.4
Thus, two tests of competitive injury are used: a broad test which focuses
on injury to competition in general (broad effects clause), and a narrow
one which focuses on injury to competition with the grantor or knowing
recipient of the benefit of a discrimination or their customers (narrow
effects clause). Courts have held that both tests are satisfied upon a
showing that there is a "reasonable possibility" of substantial injury to
competition. Price discrimination cases also fall into either of two addi-
tional categories: those involving alleged injury to competition at the
seller level (primary line injury), and those involving alleged injury at the
customer level (secondary line injury).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that interpretations of the
Robinson-Patman Act should seek to reconcile it with the nation's other
3. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955); White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy,
[Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 411, at Pt. II (May 21, 1969); Text of
Report of Nixon Task Force on Productivity and Competition, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 413, at X-1 (June 10, 1969); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977); Report to the President and the Attorney General of the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, [Jan.-June] Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 897, at Special Supplement (Jan. 18, 1979).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). Other sections of the Act forbid the payment or receipt
of certain types of brokerage or discounts in lieu thereof (§ 2(c)); require that payments for
services or facilities furnished by a customer or the furnishing of services or facilities to
customers be provided on proportionally equal terms to all competing customers (§§ 2(d),
(e)); and make it unlawful for a buyer knowingly to induce or receive a prohibited price
discrimination (§ 2(f)). The Act provides several complete defenses to a prima facie case
of price discrimination: A price differential is not illegal if it makes "only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities" of sale or delivery (cost justification defense) (§ 2(a)); if the differ-
ential resulted from "price changes ... in response to changing conditions affecting the
market for or the marketability of the goods concerned" (changing conditions defense)
(§ 2(a)); or if the "lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or
purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the
services or facilities furnished by a competitor" (meeting competition defense) (§ 2(b)).
By judicial and administrative interpretation, the meeting competition defense also applies
to payments for services or facilities furnished by a customer.
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antitrust laws.5 In 1993, the Court, in Brooke Group v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp.,6 effected such a reconciliation as to the Act's primary
line coverage. The Court first observed that a claim for primary line price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act and a claim for predatory
pricing under section 2 of the Sherman Act7 are essentially the same.8
Accordingly, the Court held that the prerequisites for recovery under
both statutes are the same: there must be a showing of below-cost prices
and of a "reasonable prospect" (under the Robinson-Patman Act) or
"dangerous probability" (under the Sherman Act) that the seller, after
destroying or disciplining its competitors, will recoup more than its losses
through sustained supracompetitive prices. 9 These standards supplanted
the primary line injury criteria of Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.,1 ° which had been almost universally condemned as anti-
competitive.11
Although a reconciliation with the other federal antitrust laws has been
achieved as to Robinson-Patman's primary line coverage, that is not the
case with respect to its secondary line coverage. The principal obstacle is
a court-made rule, known to the cognoscenti as the Morton Salt doctrine,
derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.' 2
Under the rule, likely injury to particular competitors and competition is
inferred from proof of "a substantial price discrimination between com-
peting purchasers over time"'13 without more. It is a rigid rule which has
taken the place of the market facts even when they tended to dispel the
inference of competitive injury. In such cases, competitors, rather than
competition, have been protected, and consumers may have been de-
prived of legitimate low prices.
Even before Brooke Group, the Morton Salt rule appeared to be in
conflict with antitrust's competition and consumer welfare goals. It re-
ceived, however, remarkably little criticism from the courts and commen-
tators. This may be because of a belief, expressed by then Judge Mikva in
his dissenting opinion in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,'4 that certain as-
5. See, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,
2586 (1993); Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69,80 n.13 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 450-51, 458-59, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978),
and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
63-74 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-50 (1951).
6. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1993).
8. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. 2587 (1993).
9. Id. at 2587-89. Although noting the different standards under the two statutes, a
"dangerous probability" under the Sherman Act and a "reasonable possibility" under the
Robinson-Patman Act, the Court made little of the difference, stating: "But whatever addi-
tional flexibility the Robinson-Patman Act standard may imply, the essence of the claim
under either statute is the same." Id. at 2587.
10. 386 U.S. 685 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 860 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie
Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
12. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
13. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983).
14. 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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pects of the Act's legislative history "set Robinson-Patman apart from
the rest of antitrust law"15 and there is an "inherent tension" between
them. 16 Now, however, any difference between the purposes of that stat-
ute and the rest of antitrust law may have been narrowed or eliminated
by Brooke Group's attribution of antitrust's competition and consumer
welfare goals to the Robinson-Patman Act itself. As a result, the Morton
Salt rule now appears to be incompatible with the Robinson-Patman Act
as well as with the antitrust laws in general. This raises the possibility that
in a future case the Court will re-examine the Morton Salt rule and possi-
bly discard it in favor of a market analysis, thus further harmonizing the
price discrimination provisions of the twenty-first century Robinson-Pat-
man Act with the nation's other antitrust laws.
This essay will sketch the implications of the Brooke Group decision
for the Morton Salt rule and secondary line injury analysis under the
Robinson-Patman Act. First, however, it is necessary to take a closer
look at the opinion which produced the rule.
II. THE MORTON SALT CASE
Morton Salt started as an administrative proceeding by the Federal
Trade Commission challenging Morton's quantity and volume discounts
on table salt.' 7 Finding that the discounts had resulted in price discrimi-
nations between competing purchasers in violation of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, the Commission entered a cease and desist order.' 8
The case eventually came before the Supreme Court, which upheld the
Commission's order except as to certain provisos.' 9 The Court first noted
that few of Morton's customers bought its products in sufficient annual
volumes to qualify for the top volume discount, and that small customers
did not buy in carload quantities so as to qualify for the quantity discount.
Focusing on those customers who had not earned discounts and thus had
paid a higher price, the Court opined that it appeared "obvious" that the
competitive opportunities of such customers were injured,20 and observed
that the evidence showed that the less-than-carload purchasers "might"
have been handicapped in competing with carload purchasers. 21 The
Court then declared:
It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to re-
quire testimony to show that which we believe to be self-evident,
namely, that there is a "reasonable possibility" that competition may
be adversely affected by a practice under which manufacturers and
15. Id. at 1153 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 1158.
17. Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945).
18. Id. at 45.
19. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
20. Id. at 46-47.
21. Id. at 49-50.
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producers sell their goods to some customers substantially cheaper
than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers.22
Having determined that the possibility of competitive injury in secon-
dary line cases is "self-evident" from proof of a price difference alone, the
Court made the following statements of relevance to the discussion
herein: The fact that salt is a small item in most wholesale and retail busi-
nesses did not render unjustified the Commission's finding of substantial
injury to competition between the purchasers who were granted and
those were denied the discount.23 Nor was it a reason for upsetting the
Commission's findings that enforcement of the cease and desist order en-
tered against Morton might lead it to raise table salt prices to its carload
purchasers. 24
As succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Falls City Industries, Inc.
v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., competitive injury is established under the rule
"by proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing pur-
chasers over time."'25 In the majority of secondary line cases over the
years, once the inference of injury was made, it was given virtually con-
clusive effect. However, in Falls City Industries, the Court held that "[i]n
the absence of direct evidence of displaced sales, this inference may be
overcome by evidence breaking the causal connection between a price
differential and lost sales or profits."'26 Although in the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, "the inference can also be overcome by evidence showing
an absence of competitive injury within the meaning of Robinson-Pat-
man, '27 the Court has not so ruled.
The Morton Salt rule has not been applied in every secondary line case.
Generally, it has not been applied where the discrimination was insignifi-
cant in size or duration,28 where a product component was involved and
no correlation was shown between the difference in prices paid for the
component and the different prices charged for the end product,29 where
regular and private brands of the same product were involved and the
higher price of the former merely reflected its additional value to the
consumer,30 or, as the Supreme Court held in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,31
where the discrimination resulted from a "legitimate" functional discount
22. Id at 50-51. Morton Salt's "self-evident" competitive injury inference is to be con-
trasted with the Court's approach in classifying restraints as illegal per se under the Sher-
man Act only after it has, through experience, acquired sufficient knowledge as to the
restraint's actual impact on competition. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963).
23. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 48-49.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983).
26. Id at 435.
27. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis
omitted).
28. American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
954 (1964).
29. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940, and cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
30. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1967).
31. 496 U.S. 543 (1990).
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"that constitutes a reasonable reimbursement for the purchasers' actual
marketing functions . ,,32 In such cases, an analysis is made of various
factors, such as the nature of the discrimination, the functions performed
by the purchasers, and actual competitive conditions.
The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the Morton Salt rule,
most recently in Falls City Industries and Hasbrouck. As the District of
Columbia Circuit said in Boise Cascade, the rule is "alive and well in the
law." 33
Volume discount schedules are particularly vulnerable to the Morton
Salt rule, as they generally meet the rule's requirements of a substantial
price discrimination between competing purchasers over time, and while
reflecting cost savings to the seller, are difficult to cost justify under the
rigid standards of the Act's cost justification defense. Because the use of
volume discount schedules is widespread, the rule exposes many busi-
nesses to potential Robinson-Patman liability.
III. BROOKE GROUP'S ATTRIBUTION OF COMPETITION
AND CONSUMER WELFARE CONCERNS TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Brooke Group reaffirmed what the Court had often said, that "the
Robinson-Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader pol-
icies of the antitrust laws."'34 Having done this, the Court stated, "That
below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of no mo-
ment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: it is axiomatic that
the antitrust laws were passed for 'the protection of competition, not com-
petitors.' -35 Clearly, the Court was speaking of the effect of a price dis-
crimination on competition, and not of its effect on competitors. In a
secondary line context, such an interpretation of the Robinson-Patman
Act would seem to render of no consequence any effects of the discrimi-
nation on individual competitors if competition remained healthy and
vigorous.
The Court also made it clear that the consumer welfare is enhanced by
low prices, and, albeit speaking with respect to predatory pricing liability,
stated that it would be ironic indeed if "antitrust suits themselves became
a tool for keeping prices high."' 36 The Court quoted an earlier decision,
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,37 as stating, "[l]ow prices
benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as
they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition ....
We have adhered to this principle regardless of the type of antitrust claim
32. Id. at 571.
33. Boise Cascade, 837 F.2d at 1139.
34. Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578,2586 (1993)
(quoting Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979)).
35. Id at 2588 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
36. Id at 2590.
37. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
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involved."38 The Court thus made it plain that the benefit of low prices
to consumers is not to be disregarded in enforcing the Robinson-Patman
Act.
The dissenting justices appear to agree with this aspect of the Court's
opinion. Justice Stevens, the Court's leading antitrust scholar, wrote the
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White and Blackmun.39 After re-
ferring to the majority's reminder that "the Robinson-Patman Act is con-
cerned with consumer welfare and competition, as opposed to protecting
individual competitors from harm;... [and] [f]or that reason, predatory
price-cutting is not unlawful unless the predator has a reasonable pros-
pect of recouping his investment from supracompetitive profits, '40 Justice
Stevens added, "No one questions that proposition here."'4 1
Although the Court's statements regarding the Robinson-Patman Act's
concerns with competition and consumer welfare were made in a primary
line case, the statements would appear also to apply to the Act's secon-
dary line coverage. It would be incongruous, indeed, were the Act to be
interpreted as concerned with competition and the consumer welfare as
to primary line competition, but not as to secondary line competition,
especially when the same competitive effects language applies to both
levels of competition. Such an interpretation would result in legal
schizophrenia.
Moreover, as support for imputing such concerns to the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, the Court relied on buyer liability cases requiring proof of a
price discrimination likely to injure secondary line competition.4 2 The
Court quoted them to the effect that "the Robinson-Patman Act should
be construed consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws." 43
To attribute to the Robinson-Patman Act's secondary line coverage a
concern with competition, as opposed to competitors, as Brooke Group
expressly has done with respect to the Act's primary line coverage, might
appear to be contrary to congressional intent, as indicated by the narrow
competitive effects clause of the Act, and the explanation given the clause
in the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report."4
The narrow effects clause renders a price discrimination prima facie
unlawful where its effect is likely "to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with any person who either grants or receives the benefit of such
38. id. at 340.
39. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2604.
41. Id.
42. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13 (1979); Automatic Canteen
Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63-74 (1953).
43. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2586 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 440
U.S. at 80 n.13).
44. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), reprinted in FREDERICK M. ROWE,




discrimination, or with customers of either of them. '45 The Senate Judici-
ary Committee Report explained:
The [original effects clause, which was retained] has in practice
been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to com-
petitive conditions in the line of commerce concerned; whereas the
more immediately important concern is in injury to the competitor
victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact,
can the larger general injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed
will keep it from coming to flower.4 6
As explained by the Senate Report, the clause in question appears to
be concerned with the effect of price discrimination on competitors in-
stead of competition. However, the clause does not speak of injury to a
competitor, but of injury to competition with the grantor or recipient of
the benefit of a discrimination. Hence, the Senate Report's explanation
is not supported by the statutory language itself. In Hasbrouck the Court
rejected an argument of the defendant, which the Court conceded was
supported by an excerpt from the legislative history of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, because the argument was "foreclosed by the text of the Act
itself."'47 Although some members during congressional debates spoke of
injury to a competitor, the statute that was enacted does not.
Interpreting the narrow effects clause as concerned with competition,
as opposed to a competitor, is consistent with the interpretation given the
clause in Brooke Group. The narrow effects clause applied to that pri-
mary line case, as it protects competition with the grantor of the benefit
of a price discrimination as well as with the recipient. In that case, the
target of Brown & Williamson's discriminatory below-cost pricing, Lig-
get, suffered losses that it was unwilling to sustain, after which it raised its
prices.48 Despite the Senate Report's statement that the narrow effects
clause is concerned with "injury to the competitor victimized by the dis-
crimination," 49 the Court did not find a violation because, in its view, the
evidence did not show that injury to competition was likely.50
The Brooke Group Court's interpretation seems consistent with the
fact that Congress chose to enact the Robinson-Patman Act as an anti-
trust law. As such, the Act should be viewed as possessing the attributes
of an antitrust law, which include the maintenance of competition, not the
protection of competitors, and promotion of the consumer welfare.
In the discussion which follows, it will be assumed that Robinson-Pat-
man's secondary line coverage has the same competition and consumer
welfare concerns as its primary line coverage.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
46. RowE, supra note 44, at 582.
47. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1990).
48. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2592.
49. S. REP. No. 1502, supra note 44, at 582.
50. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2593.
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IV. THE MORTON SALT RULE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
WELFARE CONCERNS
The Morton Salt rule's incompatibility with Robinson-Patman's compe-
tition and consumer welfare concerns needs little exposition. In speaking
of the former, the Brooke Group Court said, "It is axiomatic that the
antitrust laws were passed for 'the protection of competition, not competi-
tors.' "51 The premise underlying the axiom is that injury to competitors
and injury to competition are not the same. Yet, the Morton Salt rule
equates the two; from presumed effects on particular competitors, the
likelihood of injury to competition is inferred. But an effect on a compet-
itor does not necessarily portend substantial injury to competition, as,
among other things, the competitor may remain a viable force (increasing
sales and earning profits), or compete on terms other than price (e.g.,
convenience food stores, specialty clothing stores), or be a minor factor in
such competition. In Brooke Group the Court stated that in antitrust
cases "mistaken inferences.., are especially costly, because they chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. '52 Where the
rule's inference is mistaken, arguably, it acts to protect competitors, not
competition, and is thus at odds with Robinson-Patman's competition
concern.
The Morton Salt rule seems to be equally at odds with the Act's con-
cern for the consumer welfare. The Brooke Group Court repeatedly
stated that low prices benefit consumers, and plainly indicated that anti-
trust suits should not be used to deprive consumers of this benefit. Yet, in
its Morton Salt opinion, the Court stated that the possibility that enforce-
ment of the FTC's cease and desist order might lead Morton to increase
its prices "could afford us no reason for upsetting the Commission's find-
ings. . ."53 As the Morton Salt inference has been drawn in the face of
evidence which, arguably, tended to negate a reasonable possibility of
substantial injury to competition,54 its effect can be to deny consumers
the benefit of legitimate low prices. It can only be surmised how many
times invocation of the Morton Salt rule has resulted in the protection of
competitors at the expense of consumers.
Based on Brooke Group's teaching, the Morton Salt rule appears to be
too solicitous of competitors, too little concerned with competition, and
not at all concerned with the consumer welfare. Should the Supreme
51. Id. at 2588 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 2589-90 (citations omitted). Volume rebate schedules, which as previously
noted (See supra Part II) are particularly vulnerable under the Morton Salt rule, often are
initiated and maintained by the seller in response to forces of competition in the primary
line, although they may not be defensible under the rigid standards of the meeting compe-
tition proviso. This was true of the Brown & Williamson volume rebate schedule at issue
in Brooke Group.
53. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. at 50.
54. See infra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text.
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Court so conclude, presumably it would require that competitive injury
findings in all secondary line cases be based on a market analysis.
V. BROOKE GROUP'S IMPLICATIONS FOR SECONDARY
LINE COMPETITIVE INJURY DETERMINATIONS
Competition and consumer welfare concerns would seem to demand
that before the FTC or the courts interfere with a seller's pricing system,
the evidence adduced by FTC counsel or the plaintiff demonstrate a rea-
sonable possibility of substantial injury to competition. This would re-
quire that the market analysis involve, as the Supreme Court said in FTC
v. Sun Oil Co.,55 "realistic appraisals of relevant competitive facts."
56
A. REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL INJURY
Although the FTC and the courts give lip service to the standard that
there be a reasonable possibility of substantial injury to competition, the
Morton Salt inference has been drawn in the face of evidence which
tended to negate the inference or which indicated that the possibility of
injury was remote and its extent insubstantial. As noted, the inference
has been drawn in some cases where there was testimony by unfavored
customers that they had not been injured.57 It has also been drawn where
the defendants presented evidence showing that competition and compet-
itors were healthy, as the number of unfavored customers had increased,
and they had increased their sales and profits, had sometimes undercut
the prices of favored customers, and had gained accounts from the fa-
vored customers as well as lost accounts to them. 58 As one court of ap-
peals put it, "[m]ini injury" has been the test.59
B. REALISTIC APPRAISALS OF COMPETITIVE FACTS
In keeping with the scope of the narrow effects clause, the market anal-
ysis in a secondary line price discrimination case should be limited to de-
termining whether there is a reasonable possibility that competition
between the unfavored customers and the recipients of the benefit of a
discrimination will be substantially injured. As noted, this requires "real-
istic appraisals of relevant competitive facts." 6
55. 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
56. Id. at 527.
57. See, e.g., United Biscuit Co. of Am. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966); Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253,255 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
58. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp, [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 22,330 (1986); Boise Cascade Corp., [1987-1993 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 22,902 (1990).
59. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 977 (1968) (quoting Frederick M. Rowe, Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act:
New Dimensions in the Competitive Injury Concept, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 14, 16 (1968)).
60. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. at 527.
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wo examples help illustrate the failure of the courts and the FTC to
meet the standards of realistic fact appraisals and a reasonable possibility
of substantial competitive injury. The first example relates to the treat-
ment of evidence showing that the unfavored customers could have ob-
tained the lower price by joining a buying group. Availability of the
lower price to unfavored customers generally is deemed to break the
causal connection between the price discrimination and any injury suf-
fered by the customers. 61 However, the FTC and some courts have held
that if the customer is required to join a buying group, the lower price is
not "practically available," as a buyer is not required to alter its purchas-
ing status in order to get price equity.62 One may well ask why the buyer
should not be required to alter its purchasing status. A cardinal rule of
nature and business is, "Adapt or perish." Businesses have had to adapt
in other respects in order to survive. To cite but a few examples, most or
all retail food stores have had to install electronic scanning devices and
cash registers, some retail food stores have chosen to convert to the con-
venience food store format, and retail gasoline stations have had to
switch from full to self-service. The Department of Justice has stated:
The development of contractual marketing systems is perhaps the
most important development in the retailing market in terms of eval-
uating the need for Robinson-Patman, because such contractual sys-
tems permit their member businessmen, often small firms, to achieve
marketing power, a group identity and a consequent ability to com-
pete more effectively with large enterprises. A 1970 study suggests
"That 35 to 40% of all retail trade is accounted for by some form of
voluntary chain, cooperative, or franchising organization." Indeed,
in the food industry, the percentage of independent retailers affili-
ated with some wholesaler group or cooperative has expanded from
forty-six percent to eighty-three percent during the period from 1947
to 1964.63
The Report also states: "[T]he so-called convenience food store is able to
compete at unabashedly higher prices, sometimes immediately adjacent
to a large supermarket, because it offers the convenience of a small selec-
tion of frequently purchased goods, coupled with longer hours and quick
check-out time." 64
Another study found that, due to food wholesalers who sponsor volun-
tary groups of retailers, "U.S. independent grocers have been able to sur-
61. See, e.g., FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966); Shreve Equip., Inc. v. Clay
Equip. Corp., 650 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1981); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019, 1025-26 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977).
62. See, e.g., In re Dayton Rubber Co., 66 F.T.C. 423, 470-71 (1964), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom, Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966); National Dairy Prods.,
395 F.2d at 523.
63. U.S. DErr. OF JusTicE, supra note 3, at 184 (1976) (citations omitted).
64. Id at 187.
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vive competitively against huge food chain store operations throughout
this century."'65
Buying groups help small companies compete with chains and large
enterprises, and in the food industry and other industries, many small
companies have found it to their advantage to join such groups. A realis-
tic appraisal of evidence in a secondary line case which showed that the
lower price was available to members of buying groups, but that the unfa-
vored customers had failed to take advantage of the opportunity by join-
ing such a group, should lead to the conclusion that the alleged injuries of
the customers were not caused by the price differential but by their own
inertia.
The second example involves the treatment of evidence showing that
the unfavored customers had increased their sales and profits during the
period of alleged discriminatory pricing. Increased sales and profits en-
joyed by an unfavored customer during the period of alleged discrimina-
tory pricing ordinarily would be regarded as demonstrating that the
customer remained a viable competitor. However, in its after-remand de-
cision in Boise Cascade, the FTC found that, because Boise's evidence
showed the unfavored customers' sales and profits on all the products
they handled instead of just on the products they had purchased at dis-
criminatory high prices, the evidence was "not persuasive." 66 In support
of this position, the Commission cited the Morton Salt holding that the
Robinson-Patman Act must be applied to "each individual article" sold
to competing purchasers at discriminatory prices.67 Morton Salt does in-
deed support the Commission's position. However, should the Supreme
Court in a future case reexamine the Morton Salt rule in light of Brooke
Group, for the reasons stated below, the Court should also consider the
appropriateness of this specific holding.
In Morton Salt, Morton argued that its price differentials were incapa-
ble of substantially lessening competition because "salt is a small item in
most wholesale and retail businesses and in consumers' budgets."'68 In
rejecting this argument, the Court did not dispute Morton's contention.
Instead, it simply stated that, "[s]ince a grocery store consists of many
comparatively small articles, there is no possible way effectively to pro-
tect a grocer from discriminatory prices except by applying the prohibi-
tions of the Act to each individual article in the store."'69 However,
where the price differential relates to but one of many items handled by
the unfavored customer, any possible injury to the unfavored customers,
let alone to competition, seemingly would be minimal and would not
meet the Act's requirement of substantial injury. Moreover, it is overall
sales and profits which determine the competitive viability of a business.
65. PHILIP FITZELL, PRIvATE LABEL MARKETING IN THE 1990s 40 (1992).
66. Boise Cascade Corp., [1987-1993 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,902, 22,588 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. at 48-49.
69. Id. at 49.
[Vol. 481928
1995] ROBINSON-PATMAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY
VI. CONCLUSION
In addition to their incompatibility with Robinson-Patman's competi-
tion and consumer welfare concerns, a number of incentives might per-
suade the Supreme Court to reexamine the Morton Salt rule and present
secondary line injury standards.
1. Not all of the lower federal courts have faithfully applied Morton
Salt's secondary line injury inference. Moreover, there is some confusion
among the courts, and there is a conflict among the circuits.70
2. The Supreme Court has often stated that there is a need to recon-
cile the Robinson-Patman Act with the rest of the nation's antitrust
laws.71 Although the Brooke Group decision has effected such a recon-
ciliation with respect to the Act's primary line coverage, the Morton Salt
rule remains an obstacle to such reconciliation as to the Act's secondary
line coverage.
3. In recent years, the Supreme Court has whittled away at the Mor-
ton Salt rule. In Falls City Industries the Court held that the Morton Salt
"inference may be overcome by evidence breaking the causal connection
between a price differential and lost sales or profits. '72 Later, in Has-
brouck, the Court held that in the case of a "legitimate" functional dis-
count, i.e., a discount that constitutes a reasonable reimbursement for the
purchasers' actual marketing functions, the Morton Salt inference "will
simply not arise."'73 When an appropriate case comes before it, the Court
may well decide to make the final cut.
70. Compare J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc. 909 F.2d 1524, 1535 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991) (stating "evidence of injury to a competitor may
satisfy the competitive injury" in a secondary line case) with Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 548 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984)(holding "injury to a specific competitor without more is not sufficent to show that a price
discrimination 'may' substantially lessen competition ... .
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 435 (1983).
73. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 571 (1990).
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